



DUE PROCESS REQUIRES PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER DEFENDANT SPOUSE FOR CUSTODY DECREE
Husband and wife were domiciliaries of Wisconsin until December,
1946 when, as a result of marital difficulties, the wife and children went
to Ohio. Following the wife's decision not to return, the husband brought
suit in Wisconsin for divorce and custody of the children. On the basis
of personal service on the wife in Ohio, the Wisconsin court awarded a
divorce and custody of the children to the husband.' In 1951, when the
children visited the wife in Ohio, she refused to allow them to return to
their father in Wisconsin. On petition by the husband for a writ of habeas
corpus in Ohio,2 the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed without opinion3 an
appeal from the affirmance 4 of the holding of the trial court that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution 5 required Ohio
to honor the Wisconsin custody decree. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed on the ground that full faith and credit need not be given
to the Wisconsin decree where the decree was entered without personal
jurisdiction over the wife, and the children had subsequently come into
her care on a visit. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
A custody decree, since it affects not only the status of the child but
also the personal rights of both parents, presents a jurisdictional problem
of the elements which must exist in order that a court may issue such a
decree. The solution has depended to some extent on the view taken of
the nature and aim of a custody proceeding. Although personal rights may
be adjudicated only with personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 6 the
traditional view is that custody involves a matter of status which should be
determined by the state in which the child is domiciled since it is that
1. At the time of the Wisconsin divorce and custody decree, husband was
domiciled in Wisconsin and wifc was domiciled in Ohio; the children were ap-
parently domiciled in Wisconsin, and the Court so assumes without deciding the
domicile of the children. Instant case at 534.
2. Under Ohio procedure, the writ tests only the immediate right to possession
of the children. It does not allow modification of any prior award on the showing
of changed circumstances. See In re Corey, 145 Ohio St. 413, 418, 61 N.E.2d 892,
894-5 (1945) ; Bloom v. Wilde, 42 Ohio Ops. 404, 94 N.E.2d 656 (Common Pleas,
1950). Compare the procedure in other states where a writ of habeas corpus is
used to reopen the question of the custody of the children. New York ex rel. Halvey
v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1945); Boor v. Boor, 241 Iowa 973, 43 N.W.2d 155
(1950). See Sweney, Habeas Corpus-Custody of Children, 22 TEmp. L.Q. 289
(1949).
3. Anderson v. May, 157 Ohio St. 436, 105 N.E.2d 648 (1952).
4. Anderson v. May, 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 358 (1951).
5. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
6. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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state which is most interested in the welfare of the child.7 The usual
status rules as to jurisdiction would not require personal jurisdiction over
the defendant spouse.8 Some states, recognizing the shortcomings of the
technical concept of domicile, which under the common law makes the
domicile of the child that of his father, have founded jurisdiction on resi-
dence of the child.9 Four members of the majority, by saying that full
faith and credit need not be given to a custody decree entered without
personal jurisdiction over the defendant spouse, apparently treated the de-
termination of custody primarily as an adjudication of the personal rights
of the spouses in the child. Thus due process would prevent Wisconsin
from awarding any custody decree without personal jurisdiction over the
defending spouse.' 0
The primary objective of a custody decree, which is generally recog-
nized to be a disposition in the best interests of the child,-1 can most readily
be achieved by giving jurisdiction to the court best able to make that
determination.' 2 The requirement of personal jurisdiction as set forth
in the instant case has the advantage of assuring a hearing for the dis-
senting spouse and an adversary proceeding. At the same time, however,
it may cause great expense and inconvenience to the deserted spouse.
Although it is difficult to formulate a rule which will consistently -put
jurisdiction in the state best able to decide custody, an adaptation of juris-
diction by domicile, subject to a theory of laches, might meet most of the
exigencies of custody litigation. Granting the domicile of the child to the
state of the deserted parent would usually give jurisdiction to the last
state in which the family lived together, which is the location of those
witnesses most informed as to the capabilities and attitudes of both parents.
It is likely that the deserting parent, if interested, will appear. Should the
deserted parent fail to sue within a reasonable time, jurisdiction may then
be determined by the child's residence.
7. Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 Pac. 987 (1928) ; State ex tel. Larson
v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934). See 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND
ANNULMENT § 15.32 (2d ed. 1945); RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 117
(1934).
8. Cases cited note 7 supra. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945)
(service by publication on non-resident spouse held sufficient in divorce action).
9. People ex rel. Noonan v. Wingate, 376 Ill. 244, 33 N.E.2d 467 (1941);
Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936) ; Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y.
429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925). See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across
State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 819, 823-4 (1944). In connection with
this, see the weakening of the common law doctrine of the child's domicile. Board-
man v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948).
10. "Rights far more precious to appellant than property rights will be cut off
if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of custody." Instant case at 533.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, advances the argument that the
Court is not basing its decision on jurisdictional grounds. Instant case at 535.
See text at note 18 infra. However, both the majority and dissenting opinions seem
to acknowledge jurisdiction as the basis.
11. 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.02 (2d ed. 1945). See also Finlay
v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
12. See Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 42, 55 (1940). Cf. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 777-9,
197 P.2d 739, 749-50 (1948).
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A problem closely related to that of jurisdiction to award custody is
the issue of the extraterritorial effect to be given to a foreign decree under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The effect to be given to the Wisconsin
decree is material particularly to the instant case because under Ohio law
habeas corpus tests only the present right to possession of the child without
allowing for changed circumstances or future rights.' 3 Ordinarily, custody
litigation is a unique illustration of the conflict between the uniformity
principles of full faith and credit and the policy against the imposition of
the will of one state beyond its borders into domestic matters of another
state.14 A custody decree is usually subject to modification in the light of
changed circumstances in the state where entered, and therefore the power
to modify has been held to exist in any other state which later acquires
jurisdiction of the subject matter.15 The decree is thus res judicata only
as to the facts before the court when it was originally entered. Although
usually plaintiff has the burden of proving changed circumstances,' 6 some
courts have gone so far as to treat the existence of a foreign custody decree
as of no effect at all. 17 Thus, whether or not changed circumstances are
shown, a custody decree by its nature might satisfy due process when
rendered and still not foreclose a state later acquiring jurisdiction from
redetermining the right to custody.' 8 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who cast
the deciding vote for the majority, reflected this analysis in his concurring
opinion when he limited the Court's holding to a decision that full faith and
credit did not require Ohio either to accept or reject the Wisconsin decree.
Thus, since only four of the eight justices sitting (Mr. Justice Clark
did not participate) felt that the Wisconsin procedure violated due process,
the Supreme Court of Ohio is still left with the problem of whether any
weight, as a matter of both Ohio and federal law, could be given to the
Wisconsin custody decree.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. See Stone, J., dissenting in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213
(1933).
15. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). For the ex-
istence of the power in the state courts, see Stewart v. Stewart, 32 Idaho 180, 180
Pac. 165 (1919); Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1918). What
the requirements of that jurisdiction would be would depend on a resolution of the
problem presented earlier in this comment.
16. Jones v. McCloud, 19 Wash. 2d 314, 142 P.2d 397 (1943); Kniepknamp v.
Richards, 192 Ga. 509, 16 S.E.2d 24 (1941).
17. In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881). See Rutledge, J., concurring in New York
ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619 (1947) and Stone, J., dissenting in
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 214-5 (1933).
18. The Court has held that in some situations, full faith and credit need not
be given though the foreign decree did not violate due process. See Fall v. Eastin,
215 U.S. 1 (1909) (decree affecting land in a foreign state) ; Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903) (right of foreign cor-
poration to sue in local courts) ; Finney v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335 (1903) (judgment
under statute imposing penalty on shareholders). The Court has required full
faith and credit where a foreign state previously had the right to maintenance of
a child who later came within the jurisdiction of the forum state. Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 302 (1933).
Constitutional Law-
MOVIE CENSORSHIP STANDARDS HELD
INVALID BECAUSE OF VAGUENESS
The New York Board of Regents refused to grant petitioner a license
to exhibit the French film "La Ronde" on the grounds that it was "im-
moral" and "would tend to corrupt morals." 1 The Court of Appeals,
although recognizing that motion pictures are included within the con-
stitutional protections afforded speech and press, held that movies are a
proper subject of prior restraint in the form of prepublication censorship.
2
In a companion case the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the rejection by
the Division of Film Censorship for exhibition in that state of the film
"M" "on account of being harmful." 3 The United States Supreme Court
reversed both cases per curiam without opinion. Justices Douglas and
Black in a concurring opinion contended that movie censorship is uncon-
stitutional per se regardless of the standards. Superior Films, Inc. v.
Department of Education of Ohio; Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents
of the University of the State of New York, 346 U. S. 587 (1954).
In reversing per curiam the Court merely cited its 1952 opinion in
Burstyn v. Wilson 4 holding that motion pictures are protected under the
free speech and press provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
This latter case overruled the 1915 M1futual 5 cases under which movies
1. With certain exceptions, e.g., current event films, it is unlawful to exhibit
any film at a place of amusement in New York unless a license or permit therefor
has been granted by the education department. N.Y. EDUcATIOx LAW §§ 123, 129.
The director of the motion picture division of the education department shall examine
every picture and issue a license unless the film is "... obscene, immoral, in-
humane, sacrilegious, or . . . would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime .
Id. § 122. The words "immoral" and "would tend to corrupt morals" were in-
terpreted as relating to standards of sexual morality. Commercial Pictures Corp.
v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 346, 113 N.E.2d 502, 507 (1953).
2. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d
502 (1953). A further contention before the New York Court of Appeals was that
the film was not immoral and that therefore the statute had been improperly applied.
This argument was rejected, the court accepting the Board's finding of fact. Id. at
348, 113 N.E.2d at 507. See Huston, High Court to Review State/s Right to Ban
"La Ronde" as Immoral Film, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1953, p. 1, col. 2.
3. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 159 Ohio St. 315, 112
N.E.2d 311 (1953).
"... [F]ilms shall be submitted to the department [of education] and passed
and approved by it before they shall be delivered to the exhibitor for exhibition .
OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 154-47 (Page 1946).
"Only such films as are in the judgment and discretion of the department of
education of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character shall be passed
and approved by such department. . . ." Id. § 154-47b.
4. 343 U.S. 495 (1952); 37 MINN. L. REv. 209 (1953); 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 699
(1952) ; 3 SYRAcusE L. RFv. 365 (1952); see also Brychta, The Ohio Film Censor-
ship Law, 13 OHIO ST. L.Q. 350 (1952); Note, 4 WEST. REs. L. REv. 148 (1953).
Accord, Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
5. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915)
Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 247 (1915); Mutual Film
Corp. of Mo. v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 (1915) ; noted in 15 COL. L. RFv. 546 (1915).
See cases collected in 64 A.L.R. 505 (1929) and in 126 A.L.R. 1358 (1940).
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were thought to be merely a form of amusement not entitled to these con-
stitutional guaranties. In the Burstyn case, which involved New York's
use of the instant statute to ban a film as "sacrilegious," the Court held that
"sacrilegious" was an indefinite and improper standard, and that vesting an
.. . unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor" 6
was an unconstitutional prior restraint. The Court did not pass upon the
broad issue of whether any prior restraint of motion pictures was permis-
sible, but indicated that it would do so "under a clearly drawn statute
designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films." 7 Appar-
ently in the instant cases, the Court considered that "immorality" and
"harmful" were also too indefinite or other wise improper. While a
gradual process of excluding individual standards may eventually accom-
plish the same result with less societal resistance, there is substantial reason
for questioning the basic validity of all movie censorship. The free speech
and press provisions of the First Amendment were designed chiefly to
prevent the suppression of public criticism of the government and its
officials." But the provisions were drawn, and the drafters intended that
they be interpreted, to encompass the guarantee that no ideas or
ideologies would be excluded from communication. 9 Without clearly
articulating the distinctions between prior restraints and other suppressive
techniques, the Court has singled out prior restraint as most effectively
thwarting these objectives.' 0 Prior restraint may be applied either as pre-
publication censorship of all expressive vehicles of a particular species, or
as postpublication dissemination restrictions. The latter require positive
action in the form of injunctive proceedings on the part of the enforcing
authority after the first attempt at disseminating the objectionable material
has been made. Both forms of prior restraint must be distinguished from
postpublication criminal action against the disseminator.'1 The Supreme
6. 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952).
7. Id. at 505.
8. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-7 (1936) ; Common-
wealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313 (Mass. 1825); 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIoNs 884, 886 (8th ed. 1927).
9. 1 CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS CommuNIcATION 240, 52-3 (1947).
The author quotes an address by the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of
Quebec in 1774: "'The importance of this [the freedom of the press] consists, besides
the advancement of truth, science, morality and arts in general, in its diffusion of
liberal sentiment on the administration of government.'" Id. at 53 (Italics added
by Chaffee).
10. The Court usually deems it sufficient to refer to the traditional hostility
toward prior restraints. See- e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-4 (1931);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114-5 (1943). Blackstone wrote: "The
liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists
in laying no previous restraints upon publications. . . . Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this,
is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mis-
chievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity." 4 BL.
Comm. *151.
11. The validity of criminal prosecution for publication or dissemination of
obscene material is well established. See Clark v. United States, 211 Fed. 916 (8th
Cir. 1914) ; annotations to 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1461-1464 (1950) (federal statutes pro-
hibiting importation, transportation, broadcasting or mailing of obscene matter).
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Court has recognized that there may be "exceptional cases" 12 involving
a clear and present danger in which prior restraints may be justified. It
has not examined the distinction between prepublication censorship and
injunction. Neither has it articulated whether the characterization of a
particular instance as being exceptional is dependent upon the standard
applied or the vehicle of expression. The former might seem likely in
that the Court in Burstyn mentions obscenity as a possible exceptional case.
But it is impossible to believe that the Court would permit prepublication
censorship of newspapers with the standard for proscription being obscenity.
Thus, apparently the existence of an exceptional case is dependent upon
the interrelationship of the vehicle and the standard.
In a broader sense, assuming a legally sufficient standard, the deter-
mination of whether a particular type of prior restraint is constitutionally
valid will depend upon a critical analysis of the antithetical dangers in-
volved. Such an analysis will necessitate consideration of the basic theory
of the prior restraint type of proscription as applied to the particular
"exceptional case." A prior restraint upon a politically dynamic dissemina-
tion would be highly effective in protecting the restrainer from political
shifts that would remove his restraining power. If he must await his op-
portunity at postdissemination punishment, the change in political climate
might be effectuated and indeed the dissemination involved might be made
legally nonobjectionable. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this prin-
ciple in an analogous context.13 The magnitude of political dynamism is
difficult to measure, but its significant existence cannot be denied. 14 A
repressor might achieve his purpose by characterizing an objectionable
film as being sexually immoral or obscene. By placing the burden of
adjudicative action upon the prospective exhibitor the repressor may achieve
his objectives regardless of the eventual outcome. Dilatoriness over the
short run and expense over the long run can be sufficiently oppressive.
Consideration must also be given to the necessary implications of the ad-
ministrative characteristics of the censorship system. Such a system is
particularly susceptible to discretionary abuse. 15 Such abuses are not
12. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
13. In holding a California statute, making it a misdemeanor for anyone know-
ingly to bring or assist in bringing into the state a nonresident "indigent person,"
invalid the Court stated: "Moreover, [after consideration of commerce clause prob-
lems] the indigent non-residents who are the real victims of the statute are deprived
of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the California legislature in order
to obtain a change of policy." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941).
14. In 1937 the Kansas film censorship authority ordered a speech by Senator
Wheeler opposing the bill for enlarging the Supreme Court to be cut from a March
of Time. Literary Digest, May 1, 1937, p. 3. Other politically dynamic films:
Spain in Flames, see 86 U. oF PA. L. Rsv. 305 (1938) ; Blockade (Spanish Civil
War, pro-Loyalist), see Taylor, Secret Movie Censors, 147 NATION 38 (1938);
Professor Mamlock (Russian made, anti-Nazi), see Thayer Amusement Corp. v.
Moulton, 63 R.I. 182, 7 A.2d 682 (1939); The Youth of Maxim (Russian made),
see Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N.W. 152 (1936) (for political reasons
this film was classified as immoral).
15. Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1939); Note, 49 CoL. L. REv. 1001, 1004
(1949).
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always susceptible to appellate correction. Due to the equitable nature
of the review procedure, the exhibitor would be denied a jury determina-
tion of the question of objectionability, although this is just the sort of
question most susceptible to determination by a jury as an organism par-
ticularly responsive to shifting public opinion.16 Against these considera-
tions, all of which are equally applicable to other media, may be marshalled
the unique characteristics of the motion picture. A palatable medium pos-
sessing capacity as a psychological stimulator far in excess of any other
medium, it is readily accessible to the impressionable juvenile7 As a
group situation, the display of a motion picture may involve between 500
and 6,000 persons in a semi-dark auditorium; an emotional spark may
create a local disturbance which it is well within the power of the local
police to prevent. Possibly the dangers inherent to the juvenile may be
prevented by limiting the display of objectionable films to adults, a pro-
cedure apparently *within the local police power.' But the possibility of
a local outburst is improbable although significant. It is just this improb-
ability that makes it desirable that the exhibition of a particular motion
picture be proscribed only after its potentialities have been demonstrated in
practice.' Applying a test before an injury has occurred makes deter-
minative the Board's conception of imaginary injuries. The criminal
sanctions against obscenity should be sufficient protection for society in
light of the potentialities inherent in prepublication censorship for imposing
patterns of thought on grounds of sexual immorality. These considera-
tions suggest that the Court might well have faced the issue of the validity
of censorship itself rather than eliminating each standard on the grounds
of vagueness until the statutory vocabulary is exhausted.
20
16. "Now this jury system is intended, and I think it works out that way, to
bring to the trial of a case as one element, the public opinion of the community.
It is true that the jury is sworn to decide the case upon the evidence which it
hears from the witness stand, but I think that no experienced lawyer would contend
that a jury is not expected to bring to the consideration of its verdict the tempera-
ment of the community in which the members of the jury live." Frankfurter, J.,
in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 914 (1950) (denying
certiorari).
17. It is difficult to conceive of James Joyce's Ulysses being read by many
teenagers. Yet, if this book should be made into a movie, this palatable form might
be viewed by millions of children.
18. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) in which Justice
Rutledge, in upholding the Massachusetts restriction against the sale of religious
literature by children, stated, "We think that with reference to the public proclaiming
of religion, upon the streets and in other similar places, the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults,
as is true in the case of other freedoms. . ..
19. A similar consideration may have motivated the Constitutional limitation
to cases and controversies. For a thorough analysis of this problem with particular
examples of the utility of the American limitation over the Canadian advisory
opinion procedure see Davidson, The Coastitutionality and Utility of Advisory
Opinions, 2 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 254 (1938).
20. A bill before the New York legislature and apparently passed would empower
the censors to withhold a license from any film which they found to be "erotic or
poronographic or which portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversion or lewd-
ness." N.Y. Times, March 21, 1954, § 2, p. 1, col. 8; id. March 21, 1954, § 1,
p. 80, col. 4; id. March 22, 1954, p. 18, col. 3.
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Evidence-
REJECTION OF RULE THAT PARTY IS BOUND BY
UNCONTRADICTED STATEMENTS OF HIS WITNESS
Plaintiff's intestate was shot and killed by a railroad guard who claimed
that the killing was in self defense.' In an action for wrongful death
against the railroad, plaintiff called the guard as a witness after a suggestion
by the trial judge that up to that time there was not a sufficient case for
recovery. The guard admitted the shooting and only his testimony sup-
ported the defendant's claim of self defense. The jury, not believing the
guard's story, found for the plaintiff; on appeal this verdict was affirmed,
the court holding that the plaintiff was not bound by the uncontradicted
statements of its own witness. Johnson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 208
F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953).
The ancient rule binding a party by the testimony. of his own witness
when it is not contradicted or proven false is still firmly entrenched in most
jurisdictions.2 Although the courts seldom offer any real justification for
the rule,8 it is ordinarily extended to include testimony given by an adverse
party or his employees.4  In Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,5
however, the present court interpreted Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,6 which permits a party to impeach the credibility of an
adverse party he has called as a witness, to mean that the calling party is
not bound by the adversary witness' testimony.7 It did so on the ground
1. If this claim had been successfully supported, it would have absolved the
railroad from liability. RE.STATEmXENT, ToRTs § 65 (1934).
2. Jacobson v. Hahn, 88 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Yellow Cab Co. of Phila. v.
Rodgers, 61 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1932); Dry v. Adams, 367 Ill. 400, 11 N.E.2d 607
(1937); Waldbauer v. Michigan Bean Co., 278 Mich. 249, 270 N.W. 285 (1936);
Evans v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 547, 186 Atl. 133 (1936).
3. In Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 86 F. Supp. 255, 272 (W.D.
Pa. 1949), reV'd, 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950), the court expressed a common
justification for the rule: "If testimony is offered which is favorable, it definitely
can be used and is available to support the claim of the party who calls the wit-
ness. In the application of sound logic and reasoning, it is difficult for me to be-
lieve that when this rule was promulgated it was intended that the party who called
said witness would be permitted to take advantage of all testimony that was favor-
able and disregard any testimony which would be unfavorable or prejudicial to the
basic claim of the party who called the witness."
4. Kline v. Kachmar, 360 Pa. 396, 61 A.2d 825 (1948) ; Krafte v. Belfus, 114
N.J. Eq. 207, 168 Atl. 755 (Ch. 1933); Walsh v. Studwell, 105 Conn. 453, 135 Atl.
554 (1927).
5. 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
6. "A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading ques-
tions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is
an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and
impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the
witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the
adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the
subject matter of his examination in chief." FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b).
7. The court followed the reasoning set forth in 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF FDERAL
PRocnuRD - § 3153 (2d ed. 1943): ". . . the obvious intent of 43(b) is that none
of the parties . . . shall be bound by the testimony of a witness (adverse party)
called in this manner. .. "
1954]
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that the two rules were so closely related that "any statement to the effect
that a party is bound by the testimony of a witness whom he is free to
contradict and impeach is inherently anomalous." 8 This case, without
using the Moran decision as a precedent and after dismissing Rule 43(b)
as irrelevant, 9 extends the, doctrine of that case by ruling that a party is not
bound by the testimony of his own witness whether or not he is an adverse
party within Rule 43(b). 10
The sole authorities cited for the present decision are those modern
authors who would abolish both the rule that a party is bound by the testi-
mony of his witness and the prohibition against impeaching one's wit-
nesses.-" Relevance of the latter thesis follows from the court's assump-
tion, made in the Moran case, that to hold that the two rules are not of
necessity co-extensive would be "anomalous." 12 But even if the rule
against impeachment were abolished, repudiation of the other rule would
not be logically compelled, for it might be said that where a party is not
able to impeach his own witness he remains bound by the testimony. Thus,
although Professor Wigmore suggests the existence of a relationship be-
tween the two rules, 13 most courts apparently consider them separate and
distinct formulations. 14 In addition, to the extent that the court's deci-
sion is based on the text writers' conclusions that the rule against impeach-
ment is undesirable and should be abolished, it appears to be grounded on
an impossible assumption in the context of the Federal Rules. An out-
right rejection of the rule against impeaching one's own witness might
be construed to conflict with the face of Rule 43(b) itself, which restricts
impeachment to limited situations. 15  More precisely, the Supreme Court,
at the time the Federal Rules were adopted, rejected a proposal which
would have permitted a party to show in any case that his witness had
made a prior inconsistent statement. 16
However, since there was no direct attempt to impeach the witness
here,17 the holding must be limited to a rejection of the rule that a party
8. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467, 471 (3d Cir. 1950).
9. Instant case at 635.
10. Employees of corporate adversaries, such as the guard in the instant case,
are not within the class of persons which may be impeached under Rule 43(b).
Dowell Inc. v. Jowers, 182 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1950); Peterson Construction Co.
v. Lafayette County, Wis., 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 445 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 28, 1939)
(oral ruling).
11. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 896-9 (3d ed. 1940) ; MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON
SENSE AND COMMON LAw 43 (1st ed. 1947); Ladd, Impeachment of Onw's Own
Witness, 4 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 69, 96 (1936). See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule
106 (1942).
12. See note 8 supra.
13. 3 WIGMOPE, EVIDENCE § 897 (3d ed. 1940).
14. See cases cited at notes 2 and 4 supra.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. 5 Mooa, FEDERAL PRACnTIcE 1347 (2d ed. 1951).
17. Although it was not mentioned by the court, the plaintiff's counsel may have
argued that the guard's entire statement did not have to be believed. It has been held
that such an argument would constitute impeachment of one's own witness. Choctaw
& M.R. Co. v. Newton, 140 Fed. 225, 250 (8th Cir. 1905); Ashley v. Board of
Supervisors, 83 Fed. 534, 538 (6th Cir. 1897).
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is bound by his own witness' statements-a rejection which is wholly
justified. As the court points out, the rule arose in a historical setting
entirely divorced from present day necessities in which parties seldom
have a choice of witnesses,' 8 and there is no reason for so depriving the
jury of its power to find what it considers to be the truth. But the effect
of the result may be to throw some doubt on the scope which will be given
to Rule 43(b), for, along with the distaste shown by this opinion for any
sort of impeachment prohibition, it may be questioned whether the courts
will find any sense to forbidding impeachment when the party is not bound
by the witness in the first place.
Insurance- /
PURCHASER PERMITTED RECOVERY UNDER HIS OWN
AND VENDOR'S POLICY IN EXCESS OF PROPERTY
VALUE
The owner of realty carried $6,000 in fire insurance. Having con-
tracted for the purchase of the property for $12,000, the prospective pur-
chaser obtained insurance on the same property in that amount, and before
the title was transferred or any purchase money paid, the building was
damaged by fire to the extent of $12,000.1 Purchaser then demanded and
received from the vendor an assignment of the $6,000 policy, whereupon
he paid the agreed purchase price and received a deed to the property.
In a suit by the purchaser against both insurance companies it was held
that because vendor and purchaser had separate insurable interests the
"other insurance" clause 2 of purchaser's policy did not preclude his re-
covery on that policy nor did the "pro-rata" clause 8 apply to apportion the
loss between the two insurers. Judgment was entered against the in-
surers for $6,000 and $9,000 4 respectively, thus permitting recovery of
$3,000 in excess of the value of the property destroyed. Vogel v. Northern
Assurance Co., 114 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
Since the purpose of fire insurance is to indemnify loss 5 and not to
furnish a means of wagering or an incentive to arson, the general rule is
18. Instant case at 635. 3 WiGmoRE, EviDENcE §§ 896-7 (3d ed. 1940) ; MAGJrnE,
EvDENCE, CoMON' SENSE AND COMMON LAW 41 (1st ed. 1947).
1. All parties agreed that the "actual cash value" of the destroyed house was
$12,000. Instant case at 592 n.2.
2. "It is provided . . . that this policy shall be void while the insured shall
have any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, upon such property,
not permitted in writing thereon." Instant case at 592-3.
3. ". . . this company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any
loss than the amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole insurance covering the
property against the peril involved, whether collectible or not." Instant case at 594.
4. A "three-fourths" clause reduced the amount payable under the purchaser's
policy from $12,000 to $9,000.
5. 1 GOLDIN, THE LAW OF INSURANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 6 (2d ed. 1946);
1 RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE § 152 (5th ed., Freedman, 1952); VANCE, IN-
SURANCE § 14 (3d ed., Anderson, 1951).
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that only a person having an insurable interest can insure. 6 In addi-
tion, most policies prevent recovery in excess of that interest by "other
insurance" clauses, which provide that the policy shall be void if the same
interest is insured with another company,7 or "pro-rata" clauses, which
provide for apportionment among the several insurers if other insurance is
validly acquired.8 In contracts for the sale of realty the risk of loss before
settlement ordinarily falls upon the purchaser, 9 -who, therefore, has an
insurable interest to the extent of the full value of the property. However,
the vendor is also deemed to have an insurable interest in the property
since he retains legal title until settlement and will suffer the loss if the
purchaser cannot fulfill his contract. 10 In cases where only the vendor has
insured, some courts have permitted him full recovery,"' but to preclude a
windfall in receiving both the insurance and the purchase price the majority
have invoked a fictional trust requiring him to pay over the proceeds to
the purchaser upon payment of the contract price.12  In Dubin Paper Co.
v. Insurance Co. of North America,18 however, the purchaser was also
insured, and application of the trust rule in permitting the purchaser to
recover on both policies could have led to the very type of enrichment it
was designed to prevent. Such a result was avoided, however, by an
apportionment between the insurers so that recovery did not exceed the
loss; ' 4 but the agreement appears to have been voluntary and the issue
not judicially resolved.
The instant court reaches the unusual result of permitting recovery
under a fire insurance policy in excess of the value of the property de-
stroyed,' 5 a result which it apparently would have reached even if the
proceeds of vendor's policy became the purchaser's by application of the
trust fiction rather than by assignment.' 6 Recovery in excess of loss might
6. 4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrCE §2107 (1941); VANCE, op.
cit. supra note 5, § 28.
7. See note 2 supra. These clauses were adopted to meet the danger of juries
finding unrealistically high losses. Apportionment would be available in any event,
even in the absence of a pro-rating clause. 3 RicHiARns, op. cit. supra note 5, § 513.
8. 1 GoLDiTN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 444; 2 RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 5,
§ 176.
9. Generally, the purchaser is bound by his contract even though the property
is destroyed prior to final settlement. 4 Po-MEoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1161a
(5th ed., Symons, 1941); 1 RICHARDS, op. cit.. supra note 5, § 154.
10. 1 RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 5, § 76.
11. Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 131 Ala. 614, 30 So. 876 (1901);
Rosenbloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15 N.Y.S.2d 304 (4th Dep't
1939).
12. Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d
85 (1949) ; 1 RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 5, § 154; cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 223
Mo. App. 926, 20 S.W.2d 946 (1929).
13. 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949).
14. Id. at 72, 63 A.2d at 85.
15. For a general discussion of the problem see Godfrey, Some Limited-Interest
Problems, 15 LAW & CONTE aP. PROE. 415 (1950).
16. The court stated that in the absence of an assignment, purchaser could
collect the proceeds of vendor's policy by filing an action asking that the vendor
be declared a trustee for the purchaser. Instant case at 592.
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be expected in cases where lessees 17 or life tenants 1s insure, because they
are not restricted to a recovery upon their limited interest but are permitted
to recover the full value of the destroyed property. In these cases total
recovery will exceed the value of the property should others with an estate
in it also insure and should each be permitted the usual full recovery; 19
but the situation of excess payment to separate parties is to be distinguished
from the present one in which all of the proceeds inure to the benefit of
the purchaser alone. Any violation of the indemnity principle or induce-
ment to arson 20 which might exist in the limited interest situation is
unquestionably heightened when all of the excess recovery is paid to one
person rather than divided between two or more. The court here may
nevertheless have felt compelled to permit excess payment because of the
rule that "other insurance" and "pro-rata" clauses do not operate when
there are separate insurable interests, such as those of vendor and pur-
chaser. It may also have desired to prevent a windfall to either insurance
company after both vendor and purchaser had paid the required premiums.
However, there are at least two possible theories consistent with
existing doctrine which the court could have formulated to avoid its viola-
tion of the indemnity principle. Both vendor and purchaser might be said
to have an insurable interest in the possibility of out-of-pocket loss which
either may suffer as a result of the fire. Thus once the land contract is
performed and, under the trust doctrine, the vendor has paid over to the
purchaser the proceeds of his policy, the purchaser can then recover on his
own policy only to the extent that the vendor's policy proceeds have not made
him whole.2 1 However, it is questionable whether there is any sound reason
for arbitrarily favoring the purchaser's insurance company, even though, as-
suming each company's risks are equally spread between vendors and pur-
chasers, the burden over the long run may be equalized. Second, excessive
recovery might have been avoided by adopting the view that in reality the
insurance of vendor and purchaser is on the same interest; that is, each
policy is designed to insure the party who finally suffers the loss. 22 Al-
17. Simmons v. Home Ins. Co., 235 IIl. App. 344 (1925); Mancini v. York-
shire Ins. Co., 54 R.I; 79, 170 At. 82 (1934). Contra: Harrington v. Agricultural
Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 510, 229 N.W. 792 (1930).
18. Merrett v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 42 Iowa 11 (1875); Gorman's Estate, 321
Pa. 292, 184 Atl. 86 (1936); Kludt v. German Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 152 Wis.
637, 140 N.W. 321 (1913).
19. See Godfrey, supra note 15, at 415 and especially his third inquiry at 416.
20. In view of improved methods and technique of crime detection, this danger
may not be so great as it once was.
21. This theory would accord with the court's view that the vendor and pur-
chaser have separate insurable interests which prevent the operation of either the
"other insurance" or "pro-rata" clauses. It would also appear to follow the
principle of the Pennsylvania standard fire policy provision that recovery shall not
be "in any event for more than the interest of the insured. . ." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 657 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
22. By analogy to the doctrine applicable in mortgagor-mortgagee situations,
the purchaser might be denied the benefit of the vendor's coverage. In those cases
the mortgagee is entitled to recover up to the amount of the mortgage debt, where-
upon the insurer, to prevent overindemnification, becomes entitled through subroga-
tion to the mortgagee's rights under the bond and mortgage. Thus here, where the
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though this conclusion would prevent excessive recovery, it may provide
less than complete recovery where the purchaser does not have full coverage,
thereby penalizing him for acquiring any insurance whatsoever. 3  Thus,
there appears to be no solution within existing insurance doctrine which
can completely provide the purchaser with the benefit of the vendor's policy
while at the same time equitably restricting the recovery to the extent of
the actual loss. Courts might, therefore, be justified in ignoring existing
doctrine and simply permitting recovery under both policies while at the
same time requiring an apportionment of the total loss between the in-
surers.24  Although the windfall resulting from failure to pay the policies
in full which otherwise might be given to one insurer is still existent in
apportioned form, a rule which prevents double recovery for the same loss
will result in a lower fire loss experience for the companies and possibly
in lower rates.
Internal Revenue-
CIVIL FRAUD PENALTY APPLICABLE
ONLY TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTS
Petitioner failed to file an income tax return for eight years during
which he had taxable income. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
assessed a twenty-five percent penalty for failure to file a return,' plus a
fifty percent penalty for a deficiency due to fraud with intent to evade tax.2
Petitioner had previously pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of willful
vendor has already been paid the purchase price, it would seem that the insurance
company's obligation is discharged. See Brownsville Second National Bank v.
London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 298 Pa. 53, 148 Atl. 35 (1929) ; 1 RiCHARDS,
op. cit. supra note 5, § 161.
23. Thus, if the purchaser had not insured at all and the vendor had complete
coverage, the trust doctrine would give the purchaser full recovery under the
vendor's policy.
24. Some courts have refused recovery almost solely on the indemnity theory.
In Ramsdell v. Insurance Co. of North America, 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928),
where lessor and lessee both insured, it was held that lessor could not recover upon
his policy since lessee had restored the property pursuant to the lease. But see
Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 272 App. Div. 346, 71 N.Y.S.2d
515 (1st Dep't 1947), in which recovery was permitted in a similar situation. The
possibility of insurers apportioning in cases where, doctrinally, two interests are
covered was also recognized in the Ramsdell case. The court said at page 139, 221
N.W. at 655: "In equity and good conscience the insurance companies may yet
prorate the loss. .. ."
1. "In case of any failure to make and file return required by this chapter,
within the time prescribed by law or prescribed by the Commissioner . . . , un-
less it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful
neglect, there shall be added to the tax: 5 per centum if the failure is for not more
than thirty days with an additional 5 per centum for each additional thirty days or
fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 per centum
in the aggregate." INT. REv. CODE § 291(a).
2. "If any part of any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade tax, then
50 per centum of the total amount of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency)
shall be so assessed .... ." Id. at §293(b).
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failure to file an income tax return.3 In petitioner's action to recover the
fifty percent penalty, it was shown that he had carried on numerous busi-
ness transactions which he did not conceal or disguise in any way. He
claimed that although he was aware of the income tax laws, he did not
realize that he owed any tax and had no fraudulent intent to evade the law.
The district court, sitting without a jury, dismissed the action. Reversing
this judgment, the circuit court of appeals said that the civil fraud penalty
was improperly levied because it was not shown that the deficiency was due
to an affirmative commission of fraud. First Trust & Savings Bank of
Davenport v. United States, 206 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1953).
Congress has provided three civil penalties for tax delinquencies. Any
failure to file a return, unless shown by the taxpayer to be for reasonable
cause, renders him liable for a penalty of five percent of the amount of his
tax for each month in which his return is not filed, the maximum fine to be
twenty-five percent of the total tax.4 Any deficiency in one's tax due to
negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations, but without
intent to defraud, necessitates a penalty of five percent of the total amount
of the deficiency.a Finally, if a deficiency is due to fraud with intent to
evade tax, the penalty is fifty percent of the total amount of that deficiency.0
The Tax Court has sustained the assessment of penalties for intentional
disregard of rules and regulations 7 and for fraud 8 although no affirmative
act was committed. The instant case reaches a result contrary to the latter
cases by introducing the requirement of an affirmative act for imposition
of the fraud penalty.
In reaching its conclusion, the court relies on the decision in Spies v.
United States 9 that punishment for the felony of tax evasion is not appro-
priate unless the defendant is found guilty of some affirmative act of com-
mission other than mere willful failure to file a return or to pay a tax.
That decision is held controlling because the distinction between the civil
penalties for failure to file a return and for civil fraud is said to be exactly
3. "Any person required under this chapter to pay any estimated tax or tax,
or . . . to make a return . . . who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or
tax, [or] make such return . . . shall . . . be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both. . . ." Id. at § 145(a). See instant case at 99.
4. See note 1 supra.
5. "If any part of any deficiency is due to negligence, or intentional disregard of
rules and regulations but without intent to defraud, 5 per centum of the total amount
of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be assessed .. " INT.
REv. COnE § 293(a).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. Vahram Chimchirian, 42 B.T.A. 1437 (1940), aff'd, 125 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
8. Ollie V. Kessler, 39 B.T.A. 646 (1939); Nicholas Roerich, 38 B.T.A. 567
(1938) ; Richard Law, 2 T.C. 623 (1943) ; Pincus Brecher, 27 B.T.A. 1108 (1933).
In the last two cases, petitioners gave false statements to Bureau of Internal
Revenue agents investigating their income, but, as the court said in the instant case,
the deficiencies could not be "due to" these false statements. Instant case at 99.
Perhaps these statements should be admitted as tending to make more plausible the
inference of a fraudulent intent at the time the deficiencies arose.
9. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
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the same as that between the two criminal penalties 10 of willful failure to
file a return or to pay a tax 1 and willful attempt to evade and defeat tax.
12
In evaluating this analogy, several factors may be considered. First, while
the minor civil penalty is imposed on any failure to file unless taxpayer
shows reasonable cause, the burden of proof in the major penalty '3 and
in the two crimes is on the government.' 4  Thus, in terms of procedural
proof requirements the difference between the two penalties is not the same
as between the two crimes. Consequently, there seems to be no basis for
an analogy between the sets of penalties and crimes which would neces-
sitate that the substantive proof requirements of the major penalty and
crime be the same. Second, the decision in the Spies case, that some willful
commission rather than omission must be present for the felony, depended
on the implications of the statutory word attempt, which does not appear
in the civil fraud provision.15 Some support for the instant decision may
be drawn from the words "fraud with intent to evade" in the fifty percent
provision. The word "fraud," to have any meaning at all, must denote
something different from intent to evade tax.' 6  It would be a reasonable
interpretation that it pertains to some act of concealment.17 But Congress
may have intended to adopt the common law meaning of the term "fraud,"
which includes silence in the face of a duty to speak.' 8  If so, the duty
placed on the taxpayer by the statute to disclose information would render
his mere failure to do so fraudulent when he intends to evade a tax. The
argument has also been made that civil fraud means only "willful" as used
in the criminal provisions; :' thus, one guilty of willful failure to file should
also be guilty of civil fraud.
Furthermore, the history of the civil fraud section evidences congres-
sional intent that the penalty apply in the absence of affimative acts.
10. Instant case at 100.
11. See note 3 supra.
12. ". . . any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax . . . shall . . . be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both. . . ." INT. REv. CODE § 145(b).
13. INT. REv. CODE § 1112.
14. Compare INT. REv. CODE §§ 145 (a) and (b), with § 293(a). See also Gutkin,
Tax Law Violations and Enforcement; the Handling of Penalty Cases in N.Y.U.
SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 189, 193 (1948).
15. Compare INT. REv. CODE § 145(b) and Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,
498-500 (1943), with INT. REv. CODE § 293(b). See also Avakian, Fraud in Federal
Income Tax Returns, '21 CAL. STATE B.J. 430, 432 (1946).
16. It is a canon of statutory interpretation that each word must be given in-
dependent significance and the statute must be construed to avoid redundancy.
17. Congress may either have intended to convey two separate ideas by this
clause or intended the phrase "intent to evade tax" to be explanatory of the kind
of fraudulent intent required.
18. See 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs §§ 1497, 1499 (1936); RESTATEmENT, CoN-
TRAcTs § 472 (1932); 23 Am. Ju. 854-6 (1939).
19. "The 'intent to evade tax' in the civil fraud penalty statute in application
has much the same meaning as the term willfully found in the criminal statute."
BALTER, FRAUD UNDER THE FEDERAL TAX LAW 39 (2d ed. 1953). See Murdock v.
United States, 290 U.S. 389 (1933) saying that "willful" in the criminal statute
denotes some bad purpose (i.e., intent to evade) not merely "intentional."
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Originally, the most severe penalty was applicable only where an
.. . understatement is false or fraudulent with intent to evade the
tax. .. ,, 20 In 1921, the penalty which exists today for ". . . any
part of the deficiency . . . due to fraud with intent to evade tax. .. ,, 21
was added to the fraudulent return provision.m 2 2 This would seem to in-
dicate an intent to extend the fifty percent fraud penalty to any case where
fraudulent intent results in a deficiency. It also seems significant that the
statute differentiates the five percent (intentional disregard) provision,
which the court says does apply to this case,2a from the fraud provision
on the ground of intent, not on that of action or inaction.24 If the fraud
provision were held to apply to the instant case, the five percent penalty
would pertain to persons who merely ignore directions in filing returns or
computing tax owed, or those who are negligent.2 The difficulty raised
by this interpretation is that the differentiation between purposeful dis-
regard of rules and regulations, and fraud with intent to evade tax, must
be based upon fraudulent motives for which little concrete evidence can be
obtained in the absence of any affirmative acts.
The court might also have considered explicitly the practical effects
and purposes of civil as opposed to criminal sanctions. It is said that
criminal sanctions impose punishment, whereas civil penalties are levied
to protect the revenues and to reimburse the government for the cost of
policing the tax system. 26 Filing a false return admittedly renders one
liable for the fraud penalty.2 7  The greater difficulty of apprehending one
who fails to file a return would justify the fifty percent penalty here too.28
However, a negligent failure to file would be as difficult to detect as a bare
intentional one; therefore, no cost basis appears for differentiating the five
and the fifty percent penalties. From the standpoint of difficulty of detec-
tion, it might be argued that the fraud penalty should be reserved for per-
sons who both fail to file any return and affirmatively conceal or disguise
income. These inconsistencies, apparent in an analysis based on cost of
detection, raise a question whether the penalty theory is not an unrealistic
20. 40 STAT. 1083 (1919) (Italics added).
21. 42 STAT. 265 (1921) (Italics added).
22. Id. at 313.
23. See instant case at 101.
24. Where a deficiency is present "without intent to defraud" the five percent
penalty is appropriate, whereas if the deficiency is "due to fraud with intent to
evade tax" the fifty percent penalty pertains. See notes 5 and 2 supra.
25. Where the taxpayer sent the Commissioner a check for $10 saying he thought
this would cover his income tax but he would ". . . be damned if I'll keep books
for myself or anybody else, even if I have to go to jail . . . ." the five percent
penalty was assessed and sustained. Lucian T. Wilcox, 44 B.T.A. 373, 375 (1941).
Note that this was not willful failure to keep records since there was no bad purpose
(i.e., intent to evade). Cf. Murdock v. United States, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
26. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938); Lyon, The Crime of In-
come Tax Fraud: Its Present Status and Function, 53 COL. L. REv. 476, 482
(1953) ; Griffin, Fraud, 28 TAXES 151, 155 (1950).
27. INT. REv. CODE § 3612(d) (2).
28. See Lyon, supra note 26, at 482-3. But see United States v. Croessant, 178
F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1949).
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analysis seized upon to avoid calling these penalties criminal punishment.29
If deterrent value of the penalties rises to the height of criminal sanctions,
the government should not be accorded the lower burden of proof resulting
from the "civil" label.8 0 On the "other hand, the lesser social repercussions
attendant on a civil penalty, as compared with criminal conviction resulting
in possible imprisonment,8 1 argue against applying a strict, criminal law
interpretation to these penalties. If the deterrent value of the penalties is
acknowledged, it is doubtful whether fraud without an affirmative act is
any less deserving of sanction than fraud with an affirmative act.
Labor Law-
CHARGING PARTY IN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
PROCEEDING HELD ENTITLED TO HEARING
AFTER COMPLAINT ISSUED BY BOARD
Petitioner labor union brought charges before the National Labor
Relations Board alleging that the International Longshoreman's Asso-
ciation and others had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of the
Taft-Hartley Act. The Board issued a complaint and, without a formal
hearing, negotiated a stipulation with respondent union and employer.
Petitioning union, not a party to the stipulation and not consenting to. it,
filed objections to the proposed stipulation and asked for a hearing on these
objections. The Board refused the requested hearing and entered a con-
sent order in accordance with the stipulation. Upon petitioner's seeking
court review it was held that once a complaint is filed, the complainant is
entitled to judicial review of the settlement. In order to create a record
on which to base this review, the Board is required to grant petitioner a
hearing before entering a consent order. Marine Beneficial Association v.
National Labor Relations Board, 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 819 (1953).
Section 10(f) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides that
every person aggrieved by a final order of the Board is entitled to review
in the court of appeals.' When the charging party is dissatisfied with
29. The deterrent value of the civil sanctions is obviously great. See Lyon,
supra note 26, at 481.
30. It has, of course, been held that these penalties are not criminal punishments.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). Yet the lower burden of proof might
argue for requiring that an affirmative act be proven.
31. Frequently taxpayers are willing to pay the fifty per cent fraud penalty in
hopes of averting criminal proceedings. Foley, Fraud and Evasion, 24 TAXES 1034,
1035-6 (1946).
1. "Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United
States court of appeals. . . ." 49 STAT. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)
(Supp. 1952) ( 10(f) of the Wagner Labor Relations Act as amended by the
Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act).
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Board action, the usual question is whether § 10(f) entitles him to any
review at all, one inquiry being whether he is an aggrieved party and a
second whether the Board action amounts to a final order subject to review
as prescribed by that section. Thus, certification following representation
proceedings under § 9 of the Taft-Hartley Act' the refusal on the part
of the Board" to issue a complaint against parties charged with an unfair
labor practice,4 and a consent agreement entered before a complaint has been
filed by the Board 5 have been held not to be final orders subject to review
within the meaning of § 10(f). A charging party cannot seek to obtain
court enforcement of a Board order, since the Board is considered the
party to the suit once a complaint has been filed,6 and interested persons
other than the charged party may be allowed to intervene and present
testimony before the Board within its discretion. 7 On the other hand, once
the Board has issued a complaint, it can only dismiss that complaint after
it has made findings of fact and has issued an order to that effect.8 The
court can review such a dismissal on the petition of the charging party.9
2. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); NLRB v. International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, 308 U.S. 413 (1940). But the record in the representation
proceeding can be reviewed in a subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding arising
under § 10 from a refusal to bargain collectively. See AFL v. NLRB, supra at
409; General Drivers, AFL v. NLRB, 179 F2d 492, 494 (10th Cir. 1950) ; NLRB
v. Worcester Woolen Mills Corp., 170 F.2d 13, 16-7 (1st Cir. 1948).
3. In the 1947 amendment to the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act added
§ 3(d), which provides: "[The General Counsel] shall have final authority, on be-
half of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of com-
plaints under section 10, and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before
the Board.-. . ." 61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §153(d) (Supp. 1952).
4. General Drivers, AFL v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1950); Lincourt
v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1948).
5. Anthony v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1953).
6. See Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261,
265 (1940); Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801, 803 (7th Cir.
1942).
7. Section 10(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides: "Whenever it is charged
that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the
Board . . . shall have power to issue . . . a complaint. . . . The person so
complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended
complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and
time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of . . . the Board, any other person
may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. . ..
49 STAT. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (Supp. 1952). See Amalga-
mated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 265 (1940).
But cf. Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1941), holding that § 10(c),
which permits the Board in its discretion to take further testimony, is merely an aid
to the Board and does not limit the court's right, on petition of either party, to re-
quire the Board to take additional evidence.
8. Section 10(c) provides: "The testimony taken by such member, agent, or
agency of the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Board. There-
after, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear
argument. . . . If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall
not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings
of fact and shall issue any order dismissing the said complaint...." 49 STAT.
454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (Supp. 1952).
9. Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1941) ; accord, Joliet Contractors
Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952) (petitioner's standing to attack the
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The charging union also has standing to seek appellate review of the court's
dismissal of a Board petition for the reopening of an unfair labor practice
case, even if the Board does not seek review of the lower court's action,' 0
and if the Board's order grants relief to some complainants but dismisses
the action as to others, those excluded may obtain judicial review."1
The above line of authority supports the conclusion that once a com-
plaint has been issued the charging party is entitled to court review of the
Board's dismissal of the complaint or denial in part of the relief sought.
But there has been no prior decision granting review of such affirmative
action of the Board as settlement of the case by consent order. Thus, in-
sofar as the court agreed with the Board's concessions in the instant case,
12
both that the charging party is an aggrieved party and that the consent
order entered after issuance of a complaint amounts to a final order of the
Board subject to court review, the case represents an extension of the above
doctrine. The Board attempted to justify its refusal of a hearing, however,
on the ground that court review of the consent order is limited to the ques-
tions of whether there has been actual consent by the charged party,
whether there was fraud in procuring that consent, and whether the Board
has jurisdiction over the dispute.' 3 But the authorities cited by the Board
in support of its contention for a limited review are cases in which the
party seeking review of the stipulation either was not entitled to any review
whatsoever within § 10 (f),14 or was a party to the stipulation 15 and thus
clearly entitled only to the limited review. In addition, although a consent
agreement admittedly binds the party consenting to the agreement provided
the requisites of jurisdiction, consent, and lack of fraud are present, to bind
the charging party without his actual consent would be merely a conceptual
result arising from the application of the label "consent order" to the agree-
ment. Moreover, the consent of a person charged with an unfair act to
accept the form of punishment imposed upon him should not bind the
Board's refusal of jurisdiction of the complaint was apparently assumed without
discussion). But ef. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d
782 (7th Cir. 1951) (Board can refuse to decide some issues raised by the complaint
since § 10(b) permits Board to amend the complaint); Anthony v. NLRB, 132
F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1942) (workmen refused back pay is not an "aggrieved person").
10. International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers v. Eagle-Picher
Co., 325 U.S. 335 (1945).
11. Albrecht v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1950); see Hicks v. NLRB,
100 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1939).
12. [Brief for NLRB, p. 7 n.5.]
13. [Brief for NLRB, pp. 6-7.]
14. The Board cites [Brief for NLRB, pp. 12-13.] as authority for the proposi-
tion that consent of the charging party is not necessary to the entry of a consent
order: Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261
(1940); Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942);
NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942). These cases held
that charging parties have no standing in the courts to seek enforcement of Board
orders against the charged parties.
15. The Board cites Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928) [Brief
for NLRB, p. 6.], which sustained a consent decree, entered after defendants had
been charged with violating the anti-trust laws, against defendant's attack on the
court's jurisdiction.
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person injured, since there is no assurance that the charging party's inter-
ests will be protected.16 The conclusion that the charging party ought not
to be permitted to dispute the Board's negotiation of a settlement could,
however, follow from a premise that because the agency negotiating the
settlement is charged with the task of prosecuting it will look after the
interests of the charging party and the public in negotiating the settle-
ment, i.e., that the Board is the guardian of public, not private, rights.
This is substantially the theory followed by the cases which prohibit charg-
ing parties from objecting to the Board's refusal to issue complaints or
from seeking enforcement of a Board order.17 But in these cases there
was no statutory authority: either for appeal from a refusal to issue a
complaint, since such a refusal is not termed an order in the Act; 18 or for
seeking enforcement of a Board order, since the statute permits appeal only
from a final order granting or denying the relief sought.' 9 Moreover, the
enforcement decisions might well have been based on the fact that the
Board, having made dispositions favorable to the charging party, can be
trusted to seek proper enforcement of these dispositions; 20 while in object-
ing to a consent order, the petitioning party is not seeking to enforce the
Board's disposition, but is contending that the disposition is not in his
16. The court concludes that petitioner's position here is somewhere between the
position of a complainant in a criminal case, who has no standing to make any ob-
jection once the prosecution has started, and a private litigant in a civil suit, who
needs no one's permission to prosecute the suit in any manner he thinks will best
serve his interests. Instant case at 549. Using this analogy, the court finds that
petitioner has standing to seek judicial review, and, in turn, to have opportunity
to be heard. Instant case at 549-50.
17. This is the theory which prompted the courts to preclude the charging party
from seeking enforcement of Board orders in Amalgamated Utility Workers v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940) and National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,
309 U.S. 350, 362-66 (1940). The theory was also applied to prohibit judicial
review of the National Mediation Board's certification of one union despite re-
quest for review by a losing union. Switchmen's Union of North America v.
National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 301 (1943). In Stewart Die Casting
Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942), the employees were refused the right
to intervene in proceedings for the enforcement of a "compliance stipulation" between
the Board and the employer, on the same basis; and the theory was invoked to
prevent a settlement between the union and the company from forestalling court
enforcement of a Board order entered after the settlement was reached in NLRB
v. General Motors Corp., 179 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950). See Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193-94 (1941) (Board can order company to hire union men
discriminated against by employer even though they had found equally profitable
jobs elsewhere, since the Board protects public rights). But see Albrecht v.
NLRB, 181 F.2d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 1950) (distinguishing between the right to have
a complaint issued and right to review the Board's final order dismissing the com-
plaint as to one party).
18. See General Drivers, AFL v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492, 494-5 (10th Cir. 1950);
Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v.
NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951).
19. Refusal to seek court enforcement of a Board order favorable to the charging
party is not an order of the Board. See Amalagamated Utility Workers v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 266 (1940); Albrecht v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 652,
655 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801, 804 (7th
Cir. 1942).
20. But the Court has permitted the charging party to seek certiorari even though
the Board has not sought certiorari. International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers v. Eagle-Picher Co., 325 U.S. 335 (1945).
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best interest. Thus, because even an expert Board might overlook the
interest of the charging party unless it grants that party an opportunity
to object, the courts will be unable to safeguard his rights without com-
plete review. This court, in apparently granting unlimited substantial
evidence review,21 provides the needed safeguard and, in concluding that
§ 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act 22 compels the Board to hold a
hearing, adopts the best means of enabling the charging party to create a
record for that review. The court could also have fulfilled its hearing
requirement either by granting a de novo review on the charging party's
objections to the consent order,2 or by remanding to the Board for a
further hearing.24 Neither of these alternatives would save the Board any
21. The court did not specfiically discuss the scope of review to be granted
after the Board's disposal of the charging party's objections. By requiring a hearing,
however, the court seems implicitly to have rejected the Board's contention of a re-
view limited to the questions of consent, fraud and jurisdiction.
22. "In every case of an adjudication required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . . (b) The agency shall
afford all interested parties opportunity for (1) the submission and consideration
of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment where time, the
nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit, and (2) to the extent that
the parties are unable so to determine any controversy by consent, hearing and de-
cision upon notice and in conformity with sections 7 and 8 of this title." 60 STAT.
239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1946).
"'Order' means the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether affirma-
tive, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any agency in any matter other
than rule making but including licensing. 'Adjudication' means the agency process
for the formulation of an order." 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d) (1946). The
Administrative Procedure Act has been held to apply to the National Labor Re-
lations Board. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB
v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498 (1951). Thus, in determining whether a party
is entitled to a hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act, the issues would
seem to be similar to those under the Taft-Hartley Act with respect to court review:
is the petitioner an "interested party" and is the finding complained of a "final dis-
position."
23. Section 10(f) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that findings of the Board
with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and §10(e) provides that no objection
that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be
considered by the court unless the failure or neglect to urge such objections shall
be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 160(e), 160(f) (Supp. 1952). This means that unless the court
excuses the charging party's failure to urge the objections below, it will not grant
a de novo hearing. See Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 318 U.S. 253 (1943);
NLRB v. Fickett-Brown Mfg..Co., 140 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1944). There is a good
possibility that the court would permit a de novo hearing if the Board had refused
to hear the objections, since then the failure to urge the objections would not be the
charging party's fault. But a de novo hearing on the objections is likely to take just
as much or more of the Board's time as would granting a hearing of those objections
at the Board level, since the Board will have to prepare its case over again and
all the other time-consuming elements of a trial will be involved.
24. E.g., in Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1941), the court granted
the petition of employees to remand to the Board in order to adduce additional evi-
dence, holding that § 10(c), which provides that it is in the Board's discretion to
take additional evidence after its hearing on the investigation of an unfair labor
charge, does not limit the court's discretion to remand to the Board. See Amalga-
mated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 265 (1940), where
the Court said: "It is the Board, and the Board alone or its designated agent, which
has power to issue its complaint against the person charged with the unfair labor
practice. If complaint is issued, there must be a hearing -before the Board or a
member thereof or its agent. The person against whom the complaint is issued
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time in the disposition of cases before it, however, and the court's require-
ment of a hearing after a complaint has been issued and before the consent
order is entered merely extends the Board's present policy of permitting
a charging party full participation in contested cases.5
Even though this extension may lend credence to the Board's concern
over the possibility that charging parties may be able to obstruct negotiation
of consent settlements, 26 the instant decision will serve to protect the rights
of the charging party by subjecting these settlements to the same review
presently available in contested proceedings. The decision thus represents
a balancing of the interest in preserving the Board's flexibility, speed and
purpose in negotiating consent settlements, as opposed to the desirability
of protecting charging parties from hasty and one-sided settlements.
27
Public Utilities-
DIVISION OF EXCHANGE CALL TIME BY THREE IN
SEPARATION OF INTRASTATE AND INTERSTATE
PROPERTY HELD REASONABLE
The New England Telephone and Telegraph Company appealed from
a New Hampshire Public Utility Commission order 1 fixing permanent
rates to be charged by the company for intrastate services. The Sub-
may answer and produce testimony. Other persons may be allowed to intervene
and present testimony, but only in the discretion of the Board, or its member
or agent conducting the hearing. §10(b)." (Italics added).
25. In its regulations the Board provides for the participation of charging
parties in contested proceedings. 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 101.6 (1949) and 29 CODE
FED. Rwms. § 102.19 (Cum. Supp. 1952) provide appeal by the complainant to the
General Counsel if the Regional Director dismisses the charge. 29 CODE FED. REGS.
§§ 101.7, 101.9 (1949) provide opportunity to all parties for settlement of their dis-
putes. 29 CODE FED. RscS. § 101.10 (1949) provides for open hearings. 29 CODE
FED. REGs. § 101.11(b) (1949) gives the parties an opportunity to object to the
intermediate report. 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 102.8 (Cum. Supp. 1952) defines "party"
to include any person filing a charge or petition under the Act. 29 CODE FED. REs.
§ 102.38 (Cum. Supp. 1952) provides that any party shall have the right to appear
at and take part in hearings to take evidence upon complaints. 29 CODE FMn.
REGS. § 102.42 (1949) permits any party to file briefs and propose findings.
26. [Brief for NLRB, pp. 8-22 (passim).]
27. ". . . [W]e think the general policy is clear that people who bring charges
and succeed in getting complaints to be issued are entitled to a hearing. This, we
think, will not seriously interfere with the efficient working of an administrative
body. And it will, in our judgment, tend to give the party who feels himself injured
and has made a complaint a better chance to have his complaint remedied. We
think our conclusion effectuates the policy of the Act and that since it involves
a question of law, it in no sense interferes with the expert administrative functions
of the Board." Instant case at 550. But the subject of this case may well become
moot if Congress carries out its proposal, approved by the House Labor Com-
mittee, to shift the power to hear unfair labor practice cases from the NLRB to the
federal courts. Philadelphia Inquirer, March 4, 1954, p. 2, cols. 1, 2. Under the
Committee proposal the complainant would have a choice of prosecuting his own
charge or could have it presented by the U.S. District Attorney. This would give
the complainant an even stronger position than was granted in the instant case.
1. In re New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 97 P.U.R.(N.s.) 410 (N.H. PUC 1952).
1954]
690 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
scribers' Line Plant,2 which comprises 65 percent of the company's prop-
erty, is used interchangeably for intrastate and interstate services. To
determine the valuation of that part of the company's property attributable
to intrastate service the commission apportioned the total valuation of the
common facilities between intrastate and interstate on the basis of minutes
of use in each of the two classes of service. Minutes of intrastate use were
determined by dividing local (intrastate) exchange call minutes by three 8
and adding intrastate toll call minutes. The percentage of minutes of
intrastate use to total minutes of use was applied to the valuation of the
common facilities to arrive at the amount, in dollars, which was appor-
tioned to intrastate, the balance being interstate. The commission fixed
rates allowing a 5.757 return on this intrastate valuation. The court up-
held the commission order, holding that division of exchange call minutes
by three afforded a reasonable basis for apportionment of common facilities
between intrastate and interstate services. New England Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. State, 97 A.2d 213 (N.H. 1953).
Interstate services and rates are subject to regulation by the Federal
Communications Commission 4 while intrastate services and rates are sub-
ject to regulation by the various state commissions.5 The New Hampshire
Public Service Commission is required by statute to fix rates which are
"just and reasonable" 6 and for this purpose must make a finding of an
intrastate rate base 7 upon which the company is entitled to a return.
Since the Subscribers' Line Plant is used interchangeably for intrastate
and interstate services, a proper separation of the total valuation of the
facilities so used is essential to the setting of intrastate rates and to the
appropriate recognition of the division of regulatory authority between state
and federal governments.8 The courts have held that this separation must
be based upon the actual use that is made of the property,9 but difficulties
result from the fact that the property is not physically separable. A Sepa-
2. Subscribers' Line Plant includes the equipment on the subscribers' premises,
the local exchange equipment, and the line connecting the two.
3. The commission based the factor of three upon an estimate that exchange
use would be diminished by two-thirds if exchange rates were based on time rather
than a flat rate. See text after note 26 infra.
4. 48 STAT. 1072 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §2 05(a) (1946).
5. 48 STAT. 1065, 1080 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§152(b), 221(b) (1946).
6. N.H. REv. LAws c. 287, § 5; c. 292, § 7 (1942).
7. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930); New Eng. Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. State, 95 N.H. 353, 64 A.2d 9 (1949).
8. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148 (1930).
9. "That is, there should be assigned to each business, that proportion of the
total value of the property which will correspond to the extent of its employment in
that business." The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 461 (1913). See also
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930), on remand sub non. Illinois
Bell Tel. Co. v. Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595, 601 (N.D. Il1. 1933), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934); Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of S.C., 5 F.2d 77, 81 (E.D.S.C. 1925) ; Norfolk
v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 64 S.E.2d 772 (1951) ; Instant case
at 219. But ef. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 589 (1945).
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rations Manual,10 appropriate for use by both state and federal commissions,
was compiled in an effort to arrive at a uniform method of separation based
upon actual use. It provided for the apportionment of Subscribers' Line
Plant valuation according to the relation that exchange call minutes bore
to total call minutes without making any division of exchange call minutes.
The original Manual method was used within the associated Bell Com-
panies," applied by numerous state commissions, 12 and was approved by
the Virginia Supreme Court.' 3 The original Manual was revised in 1951
in response to requests made by the state commissions through the National
Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners.14 The revision, the
"Charleston Plan," divided exchange call minutes by two to eliminate the
double weighting of exchange call time resulting from the companies'
recording systems, which on a five minute call recorded five minutes for
the person receiving the call and five minutes for the person placing it.15
The revised Manual has been applied by 26 state commissions and rejected
by three. 6 Although many commissions have expressed dissatisfaction
with the results of the original and revised Manuals, this is the first time
a court has upheld a departure from the use of either method.
The chief cause of dissatisfaction on the part of the New Hampshire
and other state commissions has been the disparity between intrastate
and interstate toll rates, the latter of which are generally lower for calls of
comparable time and distance .1 7  The commissions, assuming that the
Manual method is responsible for the disparity, conclude that the method
10. NARUC-FCC SPECIAL COOPERATIVE COMMITTEE ON TELEPHONE REGULATORY
PROBLEMS, MANUAL OF STANDARD PROCEDURES FOR SEPARATING TELEPHONE PROPERTY,
REVENUES, AND EXPENSES (1947).
11. 14 FCC ANN. REP. 86 (1949).
12. E.g., In re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R.(N.s.) 122 (Idaho PUC 1951);
In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 88 P.U.R.(N.s.) 1 (Ky. PSC 1951); In re
New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R.(N.s.) 161 (N.J. PUC 1951); In re Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 P.U.R.(N.s.) 107 (Utah PSC 1951); It re Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 89 P.U.R.(N.s.) 341 (Wyo. PSC 1951); In re Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co., 85 P.U.R.(N.s.) 435 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n 1950),
aff'd, 192 Va. 292, 64 S.E2d 772 (1951) ; In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R. (N.s.)
164 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1951); In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 84
P.U.R.(N.s.) 65 (Tenn. PUC 1950); In re New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 83
P.U.R.(N.s.) 238 (Mass. DPU 1949); Pennsylvania PUC v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa.,
81 P.U.R.(N.s.) 316 (Pa. PUC 1949); In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 84
P.U.R.(N.s.) 175 (Md. PSC 1950).
13. Norfolk v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 64 S.E.2d 772
(1951). See also New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Public Util., 12 N.J. 568,
600, 97 A.2d 602, 618 (1953) (commission's refusal to depart from the Separation
Manual upheld).
14. See 18 FCC ANN. RE,. 44-5 (1953). The revision, approved on an interim
basis by the FCC, would transfer approximately $99 millions of property and $22
millions of expenses from intrastate to interstate.
15. See instant case at 22 (Blandin, J., dissenting).
16. See cases cited at 50 P.U. FORT. 592, 593; see also New Jersey Bell Tel.
Co. v. Dep't of Public Util., 12 N.J. 568, 97 A.2d 602 (1953).,
17. See 18 FCC ANN. REP. 44 (1953). The disparity has since been lessened
by the FCC's granting an 8%7 increase in interstate toll rates.
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which produces this result must be erroneous.' 8 The commissions' assump-
tion appears to be unwarranted, particularly in the instant case. Many
New Hampshire exchanges are admittedly operating at a loss when con-
sidered separately I' and these losses must be borne by any profit-making
exchanges and by the rates for intrastate toll call services; interstate toll
services, since they are under federal regulation, have no such losses to
bear. Thus the disparity complained of appears to be the result of in-
sufficient exchange call rates, rather than application of the Manual
method.
2 0
Those commissions which rejected the original Separations Manual
applied widely divergent formulae including: gross revenue (separation by
the proportion that intrastate revenues bore to total revenues), 21 division
of exchange call minutes by two,22 allowing fifty percent of the change
occasioned by division of exchange call minutes by two,23 deduction of 25%
of the result reached through the Manual method,2 4 and application to
Subscribers' Line Plant the percentage used in separations in other states.a
Others fixed temporary rates or denied increases without adopting any
method of separation 2 6
18. Some commissions followed this line of reasoning in a full circle and reached
the conclusion that the Manual's basic error lies in its employment of the actual use
theory itself. E.g., PUC v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R.(.N.s.) 397, 409
(Me. PUC 1949) ; In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 82 P.U.R. (4.s.) 498, 510-
11 (W. Va. PSC 1949) ; In re New York Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R.(N.s.) 231, 243 (N.Y.
PSC 1951) ; Rose, The Bell Telephone Rate Cases, 37 VA. L. REv. 699, 731 (1951).
19. In re New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 82 P.U.R.(N.s.) 580, 584 (N.H. PUC
1949).
20. The New Hampshire method, if applied by the state commission in fixing
rates for exchange and intrastate toll services, would aggravate rather than alleviate
the existing disparity. The New Hampshire method reduces the overall intrastate
property valuation by apportioning part of the exchange plant valuation to toll plant
valuation, only a part of which is intrastate. Thus, although the overall intrastate
valuation is reduced, the intrastate toll valuation is increased. If rates for the two
intrastate services were fixed to allow a return on the separate valuations as deter-
mined by the New Hampshire method, exchange services would produce less revenue
and intrastate toll service users would be required to pay higher prices and to support
still more of the exchange service burden.
21. In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 76 P.U.R.(N.s.) 33 (Ky. PSC 1948);
In re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 81 P.U.R.(N.s.) 375 (S.D. PUC 1949). Contra:
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) (here the Supreme Court com-
menting upon the circularity inherent in the gross revenue method stated: ". . . if
the return as permitted under the new rates be taken, then the State's action itself
reduces the amount of value upon which the fairness of the return is to be computed."
Id. at 461).
22. Public Util. Comm'n v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R. (N.s.) 397
(Me. PUC 1949). The Maine commission adopted the factor of two before the
adoption of the Charleston Plan, but for the same reasons which later led the com-
mission in the instant case to adopt a factor of three.
23. In re Wisconsin Tel. Co., 86 P.U.R.(N.s.) 79 (Wis. PUC 1950).
24. In re New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 82 P.U.R.(N.s.) 590 (N.H. PUC 1950).
25. In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 82 P.U.R.(N.s.) 498 (W. Va. PSC
1949).
26. In re New York Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R.(N.s.) 231 (N.Y. PSC 1951); In re
New York Tel. Co., 87 P.U.R.(N.s.) 1 (Conn. PUC 1951); In re New Eng. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 82 P.U.R.(N.s.) 580 (N.H. PSC 1949). Conflict with the Smith v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co. requirement of a specific separation finding was avoided by
holding that the company had failed to sustain its burden of proof as to the reason-
ableness of the separation procedure which it advocated.
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The reason given for the modifications is the supposed necessity of
taking into account the "value of the service" (the economic value of the
services to the consumer), which includes "standby value" (the economic
value of the mere availability of the services). The commissions contend
that since the flat rates charged for exchange calls encourage additional use
at no additional cost to the user, while relatively the time rates charged for
toll calls discourage use, the uses of the Subscribers' Line Plant in the
different services must be equated.2 7  The New Hampshire Commission
bases its choice of an equating factor of three upon estimates2 8 that if
prices for exchange calls were to be based on time, as are prices for toll
calls, exchange call time would be only one third as great as under the
prevailing rate structure. The commission therefore divides exchange call
minutes by three, contending that two-thirds of the use of exchanges is
artificially induced by the price structure and does not represent an accurate
determination of the value of property used in exchange calls. Such con-
tention overlooks, however, the fact that increased exchange use, regardless
of how obtained, means that a greater proportion of the property is being
devoted to exchanges and should as a result bear its financial burden.
The excess of exchange calls is easily cured by raising the exchange
charges. Although the greater use of exchange calls may affect their
value in comparison with toll calls, greater use may indicate the necessity
either for a higher return (per minute used) for exchanges than for toll
property since greater use makes it more valuable, or for a lower return
(per minute used) since greater use makes each unit cost less. With factors
on either side if value of service is considered, separation by actual use alone
seems best.
Moreover, the value of the service is in no way related to the accident
of a service's crossing a state line. Since a separation is made necessary
only by the fact that a plant, which is in reality an inseparable whole, has
two separate uses (one intrastate and the other interstate), any significant
distinction must be based upon the extent of those uses. Since the use of
property for exchange purposes is actually the same as for toll purposes
no matter what the difference in prices charged, division of exchange use by
three is merely an unwarranted distortion of the measurement of these
uses.
27. While the majority in the instant case avoids the term "value of the
service" the commission which it affirmed makes no effort to hide the fact that:
"The premise on which the modification of three is based is that free unlimited
use must be equated to measured or toll use to produce similar and comparable
quantities reflecting the value of service . . . ." In re New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
97 P.U.R(N.s.) 410, 417 (N.H. PUC 1952). (Italics added).
28. With regard to the validity of this estimate compare PUC v. New Eng.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R.(,.s.) 397, 411 (Me. PUC 1949) (Maine Commission
Engineer Gerrish testified, ". . . that a proper equating of toll and unlimited
services exchange calls requires the use of a factor of at least two. . . ."), with
In re New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 97 P.U.R.(x.s.) 410 (N.H. PUC 1952) (New
Hampshire Commission adopted the factor of three in reliance upon testimony by
Gerrish that the same considerations required the adoption of the factor of three).
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All the changes in separations methods made by the state commissions
have as an end result the reduction of the valuation upon which intra-
state rates must yield a return. Where state and federal commissions use
these different methods of separation, some part of the property is neces-
sarily excluded from the rate base, with the result that the company must
devote that part of its property to the public use without the compensation
which the commission itself has determined to be just. A state commission
cannot "transfer" part of a valuation from intrastate to interstate; it can
only exclude it from the rate base altogether 2 9 The desideratum seems to be
an extension of the Federal Communication Commission's statutory power
to ". . . determine what property of said carrier shall be considered as
used in interstate .. . . toll service" 30 to include the power to make its
determination binding upon the state commissions.
Selective Service-
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE BY BOARD REQUIRED TO
REJECT CLAIM PRIMA FACIE WITHIN EXEMPTION
Defendant, a Jehovah's Witness formerly classified I-A 1 despite a
claimed exemption as a minister of religion, 2 submitted evidence at a re-
classification hearing before his local board that, since his previous classi-
fication, he had resigned a full time position as a radio repairman, had
received the mark of ordination of his sect, and had been enrolled as a
"Pioneer Minister" and appointed a "Company Servant." 3 Defendant
testified that he devoted 150 hours per month to his religious duties-public
sermons, door-to-door preaching, congregational meetings, personal studies,
and instruction of prospective ministers-and only five hours per week to
radio repairing. Although none of defendant's evidence was contradicted,
the local board again classified him I-A. After his apepals to state and
national boards 4 were rejected, defendant was convicted of violating the
29. In re New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 97 P.U.R.(x.s.) 410, 424 (N.H. PUC
1952) (Davison, Ch. dissenting).
30. 48 STAT. 1080 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §221(c) (1946).
1. I.e., available for military service. See 32 COE FED. REGS. § 1622.10 (1951).
2. The statutory provision providing for this exemption is 62 STAT. 611 (1948),
50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (Supp. 1952). To be entitled to this exemption the
registrant must preach and teach the principles of religion as his customary voca-
tion. The Court states that the previous denial of an exemption to the registrant
was based on the fact that he did not devote enough time to religious duties. Instant
case at 390-2.
3. Jehovah's Witnesses regard all members of their sect as ministers. The
membership generally is divided into "Pioneer Ministers," who devote 150 hours
or more per month to public preaching, door-to-door preaching and sale of Watch-
tower Bible and Tract Society publications; and "Publishers," who devote less than
150 hours to these activities. The only distinction between the two made by the
Society is that "Pioneers" get a larger discount on Society publications. A "Com-
pany Servant" is an overseer of a "Company" or geographical district. Elliff,
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Selective Service Act, 31 VA. L. Rxv. 811 (1945).
4. See 32 CoDE FE. REGS. § 1626 et seq. (1951).
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Universal Military Training and Service Act by refusing to submit to
induction upon reporting to the induction center.5 His conviction was
affirmed by the circuit court,6 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the defendant's evidence placed him prima fade within the statutory
exemption and that in the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary
the classification was invalid. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389
(1953).7
The Universal Military Training and Service Act provides that, except
where regulations authorize an appeal, decisions of the local boards .with
respect to claims for exemption shall be final.8 Similar provisions of
preceding acts had been interpreted to permit review by habeas corpus
proceedings after the registrant had submitted to induction.9 In Falbo v.
United States '0 the Supreme Court held that the invalidity of a classi-
fication order could not be raised as a defense to a criminal trial where
the defendant had refused to report for induction, saying that the Act
did not authorize judicial review of the classification in a criminal pro-
ceeding." Although the circuit courts, interpreting Falbo to limit review
to habeas corpus proceedings, uniformly denied review in all criminal
cases,12 the Supreme Court, in Estep v. United States,'3 held that under
the selective service law judicial review was available in a criminal case
where the defendant reported for but refused to submit to induction, dis-
tinguishing Falbo on the ground that the latter decision rested upon
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.' 4 In Estep the Court indicated
that judicial review is available to try claims that the selective service
system committed procedural error or that the classification was dis-
criminatory or without any basis in fact.' 5
5. See 62 STAT. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. §462(a) (Supp. 1952).
6. Dickinson v. United States, 203 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1953).
7. Jackson, Burton, and Minton, JJ., dissenting.
8. 62 STAT. 620 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. §460(b) (3) (Supp. 1952).
9. See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 145 (1946) (dissenting opinion by
Burton, J.); Note, 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 827, 829 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 36,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945). The first Supreme Court case applying this interpre-
tation was Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946), in which
the propriety of habeas corpus proceedingg was assumed.
10. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
11. Id. at 554. "The narrow question . . . is whether Congress has authorized
judicial review ....
"We think it has not. The Act nowhere explicitly provides for such review
and we have found nothing in its legislative history which indicates an intention
to afford it."
12. See Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 445 (1947), and cases cited in Estep
v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 139 (1946) (concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
13. 327 U.S. 114 (1946). The statute in effect at this time was 54 STAT. 894
(1940), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 311 (1940). The provisions for judicial review were not
changed in subsequent statutes.
14. Id. at 123.
15. Id. at 120-2. From the language of the opinion all that can be said is that
Estep so indicated, for it was not necessarily a holding. The rule as originally
stated was: "It is only orders 'within their respective jurisdictions' that are made
final," id. at 120, and "The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached
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This case, the first in which the Court has found that a local board's
classification lacked a basis in fact, is the logical result of the Estep holding
that a classification is subject to "no basis in fact" review by the courts.,,
In so finding, the opinion embellishes the "no basis in fact" rule by stating
the requirement that, where a registrant has placed himself "prima fade
within the statutory exemption," some "affirmative evidence" must be found
to support the denial of the claimed exemption.17 The question of what
type of evidence is sufficiently affirmative to fulfill this requirement is left
unanswered. The circuit court below stressed the board's apparent dis-
belief of the registrant's evidence concerning his economic status and his
demeanor as possible bases for the board's action.' s Since the Supreme
Court rejected these bases,19 it seems clear that mere disbelief of the
registrant's statements will not support a denial of a claimed exemption.
On the other hand, the Court, in disclaiming a test of "substantial evi-
dence," sets a vague outer limit to its requirement of "some proof." 20 This
case would appear to have no impact on cases in which the registrant fails
to show that he meets every element of a statutory exemption as clearly
as was shown here,21 for example, where the necessary relationship to other
members of his sect is not clearly shown. 22 Since the Court recognizes
that the "registrant bears the burden of clearly establishing a right to the
exemption," 23 it seems likely that the decision will not have the effect of
only if there is no basis in fact for the classification. . . ." Id. at 122. In in-
terpreting the Estep case, the courts have de-emphasized the "jurisdictional" language
and assimilated it into the "no basis in fact" rule. See, e.g., Cox v. United States,
332 U.S. 442, 454 (1947) (Court distinguishes the jurisdictional fact situation in
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)); Eagles v. United States ex rel.
Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 316, 317 (1946).
16. This appears to be recognized by the dissenters in the instant case, who
disapprove not only of the majority's ruling here but of the Estep theory itself.
17. Instant case at 396, 397.
18. For example, the court questioned the ability of any person to live on
$35 a month. Dickinson v. United States, 203 F.2d 336, 345 (9th Cir. 1953).
19. "The task of the courts . . .is to search the record for some affirmative
evidence to support the local board's overt or implicit finding that a registrant
has not painted a complete or accurate picture of his activities." Instant case at
396 (emphasis added). "The only logical assumption . . . is that the boards
disbelieved part of petitioner's testimony or doubted his good faith in taking up
religious work at the particular time he did." Id. at 398 (dissenting opinion by
Jackson, J.).
20. "If the facts are disputed the board bears the ultimate responsibility for re-
solving the conflict-the courts will not interfere. Nor will the courts apply a
test of 'substantial evidence.' However, the courts may properly insist that there
be some proof that is incompatible with the registrant's proof of exemption." In-
stant case at 396.
21. The majority of the instant Court noted that: "... Each registrant must
satisfy the Act's rigid criteria for the exemption," and concluded that ". . . Dickin-
son made out a case which meets the statutory criteria." Instant case at 395.
22. See Martin v. United States, 190 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1951). The registrant
must be regarded by other Jehovah's Witnesses ". . . in the same manner in
which regular or duly ordained ministers of other religions are ordinarily regarded."
Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 450 (1947).
23. Instant case at 395. See Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 451 (1947).
... the documents suggest but do not prove that Cox spent full time as a
'pioneer'. . . . The board might have reasonably held that nothing less than definite
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reducing his burden. Moreover, since the opinion here specifically rules
out any question of bad faith on the part of the registrant,2 4 it seems prob-
able that the Court will not overrule the classification order where the
registrant's change of status on the eve of induction permits an inference
of bad faith,2 5 or where the sincerity of his religious beliefs is at issue.26
The Court, having previously held in Estep that a classification order
was subject to judicial review on its merits, is justified in overruling the
denial of an exemption where the only record available for review clearly
shows that the registrant meets the statutory requirements for exemption.
If the board were permitted to base a denial of exemption on unexplained
disbelief of the testimony presented to it, judicial review would be ineffec-
tive to enforce the statutory exemptions and protect the individual regis-
trant. The most arbitrary denial would be indistinguishable on the record
from any other action of the board and "no basis in fact" would become
an empty protection if satisfied by demeanor evidence. Where a prima facie
case for exemption has been made, any additional burden which the re-
quirement of affirmative evidence places upon the local board is a burden
which the board should be expected to shoulder.27 In view of considera-
tions of due process existent in all cases, and of personal liberty and free-
dom of religious beliefs particularly involved in ministerial and conscientious
objector cases,2 8 the requirement of some affirmative evidence in support
of the classification seems to be the minimum requirement consonant with
judicial protection of registrants from unwarranted refusals to grant the
exemptions provided by the Act.
evidence of his full devotion of his available time to religious leadership would
suffice. . . ." Ibid. See also Imboden v. United States, 194 F.2d 508, 512 (6th
Cir. 1952); 32 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 1622.1(c), 1622.5 (1951).
24. Instant case at 393 n.5.
25. See Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947); Eagles v. United States
ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946) ; Eagles v. United States ex rel. Horowitz, 329
U.S. 317 (1946).
26. See United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
27. The board's task may be aided by its power to subpoena (32 CODE FED.
REGs. § 1621.15 (1951)) and to obtain information from any welfare or govern-
mental agency (32 CoDE FED. Rr~s. § 1621.14 (1951)). However, see United
States v. Stasevic, 117 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), for an opinion that the in-
vestigatory report of the FBI cannot alone constitute a basis in fact for denial of an
exemption.
28. For a recent application of the Dickinson case to a conscientious objector
claim see Jewell v. United States, 208 F.2d 770 (6th Cir. 1953).
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